Insurance by Lee, Richard H. & Mussetto, Teresa L.
University of Miami Law School
Institutional Repository
University of Miami Law Review
5-1-1980
Insurance
Richard H. Lee
Teresa L. Mussetto
Follow this and additional works at: http://repository.law.miami.edu/umlr
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Institutional Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in University of Miami Law
Review by an authorized administrator of Institutional Repository. For more information, please contact library@law.miami.edu.
Recommended Citation
Richard H. Lee and Teresa L. Mussetto, Insurance, 34 U. Miami L. Rev. 765 (1980)
Available at: http://repository.law.miami.edu/umlr/vol34/iss3/10
Insurance
RICHARD H. LEE* AND TERESA L. MUSSETTO**
This article focuses on recent legislative changes and judi-
cial interpretations in the area of automobile insurance. The
question whether insurers should be joined as parties defen-
dant with their insureds as a matter of policy remains un-
answered, as the Supreme Court of Florida struck down the
nonjoinder statute as unconstitutional. The authors examine
the new mandatory option for uninsured motorist coverage and
the interaction of such benefits with other coverages and exclu-
sions. The stacking of coverages still applies to some policies
and may be crucial in underinsured motorist situations. Atten-
tion is also given to problems of concurrencies between per-
sonal injury protection and other coverages.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Since the last survey article on insurance appeared in this
journal,' the legislature has directed much of its effort towards re-
quiring less automobile insurance, presumably in the hope that the
resulting lower rates may in turn bring about greater compliance
with the law. The legislature abolished compulsory liability insur-
ance' by deleting from section 627.733 of the Florida Statutes the
requirement that liability insurance sufficient to qualify under the
provisions of the Financial Responsibility Laws be maintained. All
that an owner of an automobile need now carry is no-fault cover-
* Professor of Law, University of Miami School of Law.
** Instructor, University of Miami School of Law (1980-1981); J.D., University of
Miami School of Law; Member, University of Miami Law Review.
1. Lee & Polk, Insurance, 1976 Developments in Florida Law, 31 U. MIAMI L. REV.
1061 (1977).
2. Florida Insurance and Tort Reform Act of 1977, Fla. Laws ch. 468, § 31.
3. FLA. STAT. §§ 324.021(7), .151 (1979).
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age.4 Though the amount of that coverage has been increased from
$5,000 to $10,000,5 the deductibles have also risen,6 so that it is
now possible to operate a motor vehicle legally with a bare mini-
mum of protection for the owner himself and those few others pro-
tected by his personal injury protection (PIP) coverage. This seems
not unwise if the eventual plan is to increase the coverage drasti-
cally. Liability insurance, with its dependence upon fault, has
failed to provide adequate protection to the general public who
may be injured in automobile accidents.7 It can adequately protect
the insured from the results of his own negligence, but more is
needed. Eventually, an unlimited no-fault system may provide the
answer.
In another area, the 1979 Florida Legislature created the Legal
Expense Insurance Act,0 which has an immense potential impact
upon the legal profession. It provides for the recognition and regu-
lation of organizations whose functions are either to pay for legal
services, or, what is more significant, to provide such services. Al-
though this new departure is too important to evaluate and com-
ment on in a survey article at this early date, it will be interesting
to see what use is made of this new kind of coverage and how it
will affect the practice of law.
As always, the courts have been busy with insurance matters,
including disputes over uninsured motorist coverage, 9 the necessity
of a written rejection if the coverage is not to equal the liability
limits,10 and stacking, 1 despite its abolition by the legislature. 2
Also, there have been decisions regarding concurrency between lia-
bility carriers of lessors and lessees of automobiles, 8 as well as
concurrency and overlap between the various first party no-fault
coverages.14 We shall deal with some of the cases in these areas
later.
4. Florida Automobile Reparations Reform Act, FLA. STAT. §§ 627.730-.741 (1979).
5. Id. § 627.736(1) (1979).
6. Id. § 627.739(2) (1979).
7. Often, for example, a plaintiff's claim goes unredressed because a judgment-proof
defendant is uninsured or underinsured, or, because of the long delays and high costs of
litigation, a needy plaintiff may be forced to settle his claim below his actual losses.
8. 1979 Fla. Laws ch. 103 (to be codified at FLA. STAT. §§ 647.01-.19 (1979)).
9. See notes 29-33 and accompanying text infra.
10. See notes 34-52 and accompanying text infra.
11. See notes 53-80 and accompanying text infra.
12. See note 54 and accompanying text infra.
13. See notes 92-104 and accompanying text infra.
14. See notes 81-91 and accompanying text infra.
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II. JOINDER OF INSURERS
One of the most interesting decisions of 1979 to insurance law-
yers is Markert v. Johnston,15 because by striking down the statute
prohibiting joinder of insurers in suits against their insureds,"e the
Supreme Court of Florida resurrected the ghost of Shingleton v.
Bussey.17 Shingleton, it will be remembered, permitted direct suit
against a tortfeasor's insurer as an additional party defendant, de-
spite a clause in the insurance contract insisting that no action
shall lie against the company until a judgment had been rendered
against the insured. In Shingleton, the possible prejudice implicit
in the jury's awareness of the existence of insurance was deemed
outweighed by the desirability of allowing the plaintiff to sue the
real party in interest. The legislature, apparently feeling that join-
der of the insurer might result in larger verdicts, and under pres-
sure to keep insurance costs down, enacted section 627.7262 of the
Florida Statutes.18 This provision created a procedure which as-
sured the plaintiff that the insurance would be available if needed,
but which would keep the name of the carrier out of the title of the
action, presumably preventing jury speculation on the existence of
insurance.
15. 367 So. 2d 1003 (Fla. 1979).
16. FLA. STAT. § 627.7262 (1979).
17. 223 So. 2d 713 (Fla. 1969).
18. FLA. STAT. § 627.7262 provides:
(1) No motor vehicle liability insurer shall be joined as a party defendant
in an action to determine the insured's liability. However, each insurer which
does or may provide liability insurance coverage to pay all or a portion of any
judgment which might be entered in the action shall file a statement, under
oath, of a corporate officer setting forth the following information with regard to
each known policy of insurance:
(a) The name of the insurer.
(b) The name of each insured.
(c) The limits of liability coverage.
(d) A statement of any policy or coverage defense which said
insurer reasonably believes is available to said insurer filing the
statement at the time of filing said statement.
(2) The statement required by subsection (1) shall be amended immedi-
ately upon discovery of facts calling for an amendment to said statement.
(3) If the statement or any amendment thereto indicates that a policy or
coverage defense has been or will be asserted, then the insurer may be joined as
a party.
(4) After the rendition of a verdict, or final judgment by the court if the
case is tried without a jury, the insurer may be joined as a party and judgment
may be entered by the court based upon the statement or statements herein
required.
(5) The rules of discovery shall be available to discover the existence and
policy provisions of liability insurance coverage.
1980]
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The supreme court in Markert struck down this nonjoinder
statute as an unconstitutional intrusion upon its rulemaking
power. Justice Alderman, concurring specially, expressed the opin-
ion that the legislature had set forth the public policy of the state
regarding joinder of automobile insurance companies and hoped
that the supreme court would adopt the substance of the statute as
a rule of procedure.1 9 This the supreme court has not done. It
would seem that the court endorsed the policy expressed in Shin-
gleton and agreed that the jury should know that an insurer is the
real party in interest. Markert seems a constitutionally sound deci-
sion, but as a matter of public policy the result appears
questionable.
Damico v. Lundberg,20 a recent decision by the District Court
of Appeal, Second District, points up the real reason for not al-
lowing joinder of the insurer. In an automobile negligence action,
the trial court dismissed defendant's liability carrier in reliance on
section 627.7262 and then proceeded to trial on the merits, result-
ing in a jury verdict for the defendant. On appeal, the court agreed
with the plaintiff-appellant that, in light of Markert, the dismissal
of the insurer was error. The appellant further argued that the er-
ror was prejudicial because had the jury known that an insurance
company would have to pay any judgment, they might have found
liability. The appellate court found no reversible error because
"[e]ven had that information been added, the state of the evidence
was such that a verdict for appellant would have been incredi-
ble." 21 This rationale suggests that if the question of fault had
been closer, the existence of coverage might have been a legitimate
factor to be considered by the jury. When could insurance or the
lack of it ever be relevant to the issue of liability? May not trial
courts refuse to allow joinder of insurers with impunity? Although
under Markert and Shingleton such a refusal may be error, to call
it prejudicial is to admit that joinder sways juries, a result the leg-
islature had sought to avoid.
But when liability exists or even when the issue is in doubt,
the parties are entitled to full disclosure of insurance and of policy
defenses. This is a legitimate factor in settlement, however irrele-
vant it may be in determining liability. In Davis v. Nationwide
Mutual Fire Insurance Co.,2" the failure of the defendant's attor-
19. 367 So. 2d at 1006.
20. 379 So. 2d 964 (Fla. 2d DCA 1979).
21. Id. at 965.
22. 370 So. 2d 1162 (Fla. 1st DCA 1979).
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ney to disclose the full available coverage was held sufficient bad
faith to sustain a judgment against the insurers in excess of the
policy limits. Even though the plaintiff made no offer to settle, the
misrepresentation had affected his decision not to make one. Join-
der of the insurers as parties from the beginning would have
avoided this result, although the jury might have been affected by
its awareness of the coverage. Had the procedure set forth in sec-
tion 627.7262 been followed, the parties would have had full disclo-
sure but the fact of insurance would have been kept from the jury.
It would seem that Justice Alderman's suggestion in his Markert
concurrence that the substance of the stricken statute be adopted
as a rule of procedure has considerable merit.
III. ASSIGNMENT OF POLICIES
Before moving on to a consideration of the cases dealing with
uninsured motorist coverage and other automobile insurance mat-
ters, it seems appropriate to discuss briefly one case dealing with a
general liability policy. Except in marine insurance and in a few
specifically recognized exceptions such as death of the insured, a
contract of insurance is essentially personal, each party having in
view the character, credit, and conduct of the other.2 8 As Vance
said, "[tihe contract of insurance is not attached to the property
which is the subject of the insurance, nor does it run with it to a
transferee."2 4 But in Maryland Casualty Co. v. Murphy,8 the Dis-
trict Court of Appeal, Third District, held that absent a clause in
the policy prohibiting assignment, a liability policy was assignable
without the insurer's consent.
In Murphy, the sellers and purchaser of an office building and
parking garage prorated the premium on the sellers' liability insur-
ance at the closing. The parties clearly intended to allow the pur-
chaser the benefit of the sellers' insurance, but apparently no one
notified the insurance company. Two days after the closing, a third
party was injured on the garage premises and made a claim against
the insurer. The insurer denied liability because the policy no-
where mentioned the purchaser and covered only the sellers' liabil-
ity to the injured party.2 6 The court found that the sellers were not
23. W. VANCE, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OP INSURANCE 96 (3d ed. 1951).
24. Id.
25. 342 So. 2d 1051 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977).
26. The sellers may have been liable on the theory that they created the dangerous
condition or nuisance which caused the injury and that the purchaser had not been in pos-
session long enough to correct it. See Pharm v. Lituchy, 283 N.Y. 130, 27 N.E.2d 811 (N.Y.
1980]
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at fault and granted summary judgment in their favor, but held
their insurer liable.
The court determined that, absent a "no assignment" clause in
the policy, the policy was assignable to the purchaser, quoting from
section 627.422 of the Florida Statutes, which provides that "[a]
policy may be assignable or not assignable, as provided by its
terms." A reading of the entire section,27 however, indicates that it
contemplates the assignment of the proceeds of a life or disability
policy, not an assignment which would substitute one insured for
another, or one risk for another. Furthermore, although it is true
that the statute permits assignment if provided for in the policy,
the conclusion that a failure to provide such also permits assign-
ment seems wholly unwarranted.
Even in the vendor-purchaser situation, in which Florida law
gives the purchaser the benefit of the vendor's fire insurance after
the signing of the contract and before title passes, 28 the vendor re-
mains the insured party. The vendor must have an insurable inter-
est, and the purchaser gets the insurance proceeds not as an in-
sured but through the vendor, as the result of equitable
conversion. But in Murphy the named insureds had no liability.
The subject matter of the policy, the sellers' liability, was changed
to the purchaser's liability without the consent of the insurer. This
is such a substantial departure from the basic principles of con-
tract and insurance law that it should not go unchallenged.
IV. UNINSURED MOTORIST COVERAGE
A. Excluded Third-Party Beneficiaries
In tackling the difficult problem of interrelated but distinct
coverage, the courts have remained faithful to basic contract prin-
1940).
27. FLA. STAT. § 627.422 (1979) provides:
A policy may be assignable, or not assignable, as provided by its terms. Sub-
ject to its terms relating to assignability, any life or disability policy, whether
heretofore or hereafter issued, under the terms of which the beneficiary may be
changed upon the sole request of the insured, may be assigned either by pledge
or transfer of title, by an assignment executed by the insured alone and deliv-
ered to the insurer, whether or not the pledgee or assignee is the insurer. Any
such assignment shall entitle the insurer to deal with the assignee as the owner
or pledgee of the policy in accordance with the terms of the assignment, until
the insurer has received at its home office written notice of termination of the
assignment or pledge, or written notice by or on behalf of some other. person
claiming some interest in the policy in conflict with the assignment.
28. Nelson Properties Inc. v. Denham, 123 Fla. 382, 167 So. 35 (1936).
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ciples. In the field of automobile insurance, questions arise when
the third-party beneficiary of an insurance contract (e.g., a family
member or an employee of the named insured) attempts to collect
under the uninsured motorist (UM) provisions of the named in-
sured's policy, when prevented by an exclusion in its liability sec-
tion from recovering directly against the tortfeasor-policy holder.
For example, in Reid v. Allstate Insurance Co.,29 the plaintiff-
daughter, injured in the family car while her sister was driving,
attempted to collect UM benefits under her father's automobile
policy. Because of the household exclusion, she could not maintain
suit against her sister as the "insured" on the basis of liability.
Another exclusion provided that no vehicle named in the policy as
the insured vehicle (here, the family car) could qualify as an unin-
sured vehicle for purposes of UM protection. Thus, although the
automobile involved in the accident was, in fact, uninsured as to
the plaintiff, the court held that she could not recover UM benefits
under the policy.
A similar result was reached in Hartford Accident & Indem-
nity Co. v. Fonck, ° a case involving the fellow-ejnployee exclusion.
In Fonck, the plaintiff was injured when one of the employer's ve-
hicles, negligently parked by a fellow employee, toppled over,
throwing the plaintiff off the truck bed. In denying the employee
recovery under the UM provisions of his employer's policy, the
court emphasized that Fonck was a potential insured "solely be-
cause of his status of occupying the vehicle as an employee and not
because of any coverage he purchased."3 1 While the opinion failed
to mention any exclusion in the UM provisions of the policy simi-
lar to that considered in Reid, the court did reiterate the rationale
expressed by the District Court of Appeal, Fourth District, that to
hold differently would be, in effect, to nullify an otherwise valid
exclusion in the liability contract.8 2
The Reid and Fonck decisions recognize two exceptions to the
general rule "that an insurer may not limit the applicability of UM
protection." 3 They represent sound policy, however, because in
each case the court upheld the basic character of the insurance
contract under which the plaintiff had claimed. To have found cov-
erage in either case, would have been to transform a liability policy
29. 344 So. 2d 877 (Fla. 4th DCA 1977), afj'd, 352 So. 2d 1172 (1977).
30. 344 So. 2d 595 (Fla. 2d DCA 1977).
31. Id. at 596.
32. See id. at 597; Reid v. Allstate Ins. Co., 344 So. 2d at 880.
33. Reid v. Allstate Ins. Co., 344 So. 2d at 879.
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into an accident policy, which the courts should not and did not
* do.
B. Rejection of Uninsured Motorist Coverage
Where UM coverage does apply, it is the legislative intent that
this first-party coverage be available to the insured in limits equal
to those of his liability coverage. To that end, section 627.727(2) of
the Florida Statutes provides that an insurer must offer UM cover-
age up to the limits of the policyholder's liability protection."4
From that standpoint, UM coverage may be considered quasi-com-
pulsory in nature. The beneficial effects of such mandatory protec-
tion, however, are diminished by provisions in the statutes' which
enable the policyholder to reject this coverage in whole or in part.
A rejection of UM coverage, where made, must be an affirma-
tive and informed one; so held the District Court of Appeal,
Fourth District, in Lumbermen's Mutual Casualty Co. v. Beaver."
In Beaver, the plaintiff bicyclist was covered under a policy issued
to another, Norman Welch. The Welch policy provided bodily in-
jury limits of $100,0)0/$300,000 for liability, yet the UM coverage
limits were only $10,000/$20,000. The defendant's agent, who sold
Welch the policy, contended that "to the best of his recollection
and knowledge he had advised Welch of his options ' 87 to purchase
UM coverage up to a maximum of the bodily injury limits. The
agent had no written proof of Welch's rejection of the higher UM
limits; Welch, on the other hand, testified that there was no discus-
sion concerning his UM options.8 8 The court concluded that the
insurer in this case had failed to prove that the insured had affirm-
atively rejected the statutorily mandated limits. It further ap-
proved the rule, promulgated by the State Department of Insur-
34. FLA. STAT. § 627.727(2) (1979) provides:
The limits of uninsured motorist coverage shall be not less than the limits of
bodily injury liability insurance purchased by the named insured, or such lower
limit complying with the company's rating plan as may be selected by the named
insured, but in any event the insurer shall make available, at the written request
of the insured, limits up to $100,000 each person, $300,000 each occurrence, irre-
spective of the limits of bodily injury liability purchased, in compliance with the
company's rating plan.
35. Id. § 627.727(1) (1979) provides that "the coverage required under this section shall
not be applicable when, or to the extent that, any insured named in the policy shall reject
the coverage."
36. 355 So. 2d 441 (Fla. 4th DCA 1978); accord, American Motorists Ins. Co. v. Wein-
garten, 355 So. 2d 821 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978).
37. 355 So. 2d at 442.
38. Id.
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ance, requiring insurers to maintain evidence that UM coverage up
to the bodily injury limits of the policy had been offered to the
insured.89
Prior to the decision in Beaver, a written rejection of maxi-
mum UM coverage was not required. In Glover v. Aetna Insurance
Co.,40 the District Court of Appeal, First District, concluded that
since the statute failed to specify the method or means whereby an
insured must reject the coverage, an admitted oral rejection suf-
ficed.' 1 The First District later held as a point of evidence, in
American Motorists Insurance Co. v. Weingarten,'2 that "an in-
formed rejection of additional uninsured motorist coverage cannot,
without extrinsic evidence, be implied from the insured's signature
on an application for uninsured motorist coverage to lower lim-
its."'8 Although these two decisions turned on the factual question
of whether the insured had made an informed rejection, it is clear
that for the protection of both insurer" and insured,"' a written
record of such a refusal should be maintained."
39. FLA. ADMIN. CODE § 4-28.02 (1971) (repealed 1979), quoted in 355 So. 2d at 444,
provided as follows:
Chapter 71-88, Laws of the State of Florida, as respects the provision for in-
creased uninsured motorist coverage limits, is applicable to policies with effec-
tive dates or renewal dates on or after January 1, 1972. Evidence must be main-
tained by the company that such coverage was offered in limits up to the bodily
injury limits of liability applicable to the policy. The applicant or insured may
accept limits for uninsured motorist coverage in an amount less than the bodily
injury limits of the policy.
The Court in Beaver rejected the contention that § 4-28.02 violated FLA. STAT. § 624.308(1)
(1971) because it modified or extended § 627.727(1). See 355 So. 2d at 444. 1976 Fla. Laws
ch. 76-266, § 3 substantially revised FLA. STAT. § 627.727(1) (1971), rendering the rule obso-
lete. See Increased Limits-Uninsured Motorist, Rule No. 4-28.02, Fla. Admin. Weekly,
Feb. 16, 1979, at 4.
40. 363 So. 2d 12 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978).
41. Id. at 13. In Glover, it was also apparent that the employer's rejection of UM cover-
age when purchasing the insurance policy binds the employee.
42. 355 So. 2d 821 (Fla. 1st DCA 1978).
43. Id.
44. A written refusal precludes a liability such as that incurred in Weingarten or Bea-
ver beyond the limits stipulated in the policy.
45. This is particularly true since the insurance policy is a classic example of an adhe-
sion contract. See generally Kessler, Contracts of Adhesion-Some Thoughts About Free-
dom of Contract, 43 COLUM. L. REv. 629 (1943); Llewellyn, What Price Contract?-An Es-
say in Perspective, 40 YALE L.J. 704 (1931); Patterson, The Delivery of a Life-Insurance
Policy, 33 HARv. L. REv. 198 (1919).
46. On July 9, 1973, the State Insurance Department issued Bulletin 586, which re-
quires written rejection of UM coverage by the insured effective October 1, 1973. The valid-
ity of that regulation was upheld by the Fifth Circuit in Harris v. United States Fidelity &
Guar. Co., 569 F.2d 850 (5th Cir. 1978). See Glover v. Aetna Ins. Co., 363 So. 2d 12, 13 (Fla.
1st DCA 1978).
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A different problem arises when the lessor-lessee relationship
is involved. Section 627.727(1) of the Florida Statutes, 7 as con-
strued by the District Court of Appeal, Fourth District, in Mat-
tingly v. Liberty Mutual Insurance Co.,48 provides that the lessee
of a vehicle (for a period of at least one year) shall have the sole
privilege to reject UM coverage only when he either is the named
insured in a policy providing liability coverage on the leased vehi-
cle, or is named on a certificate of a master policy issued to the
lessor. In Mattingly, the court held that a lessee who was not the
named insured in any policy or certificate of a master policy issued
to the lessor was bound by the latter's waiver of higher UM limits.
In the earlier case of Guardado v. Greyhound Rent-A-Car, Inc.,49
the District Court of Appeal, Third District, had been explicit in
holding that even though the self-insured automobile lessor's
waiver was not communicated to the lessee, the lessee was none-
theless effectively bound by it.
Such decisions may be said to advance the principle of free-
dom of contract; but, in an adhesion contract situation,5" they
seem rather to provide a loophole for circumventing the "informed
and affirmative" waiver requirement which has been established.
Further, by undercutting the benefits made available to the ulti-
mate insured, such decisions conflict with the current philosophy
of protecting the public as a third party beneficiary of automobile
accident insurance. 52
C. Stacking and Underinsured Motorists
As a counterbalance to the mandatory option for higher UM
47. FLA. STAT. § 627.727(1) (1979) provides:
When a vehicle is leased for a period of 1 year or longer and the lessor of such
vehicle, by the terms of the lease contract, provides liability coverage on the
leased vehicle in a policy wherein the lessee is a named insured or on a certifi-
cate of a master policy issued to the lessor, the lessee of such vehicle shall have
the sole privilege to reject uninsured motorist coverage.
48. 363 So. 2d 147 (Fla. 4th DCA 1978).
49. 340 So. 2d 510 (Fla. 3d DCA 1976).
50. See note 45 supra.
51. See Mattingly v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 363 So. 2d 147, 150 (Fla. 4th DCA 1978)
(Anstead, J., dissenting).
52. That liability insurance policies have evolved into third-party beneficiary contracts
is nowhere better seen than in the case of Boston Old Colony Ins. Co. v. Gutierrez, 360 So.
2d 464 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978). There, in a suit brought by the injured party against the
tortfeasor's liability insurance carrier, the insurer was held to a verdict of over one million
dollars for bad-faith failure to settle with the plaintiff.
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coverage limits" (affording potentially increased levels of first-
party motorist protection), section 627.4132 of the Florida Statutes
provides for the abolition of "stacking," or the aggregation of bene-
fits accruing to the insured under more than one policy or under
multiple coverages within a single policy."' The Supreme Court of
Florida, in Gillette v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance
Co.," has found this anti-stacking statute to be constitutional. On
the theory that an insured is charged with notice of legislation af-
fecting his insurance contract only as of that legislation's effective
date, however, the court has also held that the anti-stacking stat-
ute applies only after October 1, 1976.6 Thus stacking, which is a
substantive right, is still applied in those cases dealing with insur-
ance policies issued or renewed prior to that date.57
Because of the recent statutory expansion of the uninsured
motorist concept to include underinsurance5 8 (levels of tortfeasor
53. See note 34 and accompanying text supra.
54. FLA. STAT. § 627.4132 (1979) provides:
If an insured or named insured is protected by any type of motor vehicle insur-
ance policy for liability, uninsured motorist, personal injury protection, or any
other coverage, the policy shall provide that the insured or named insured is
protected only to the extent of the coverage he has on the vehicle involved in the
accident. However, if none of the insured's or name insured's vehicles is involved
in the accident, coverage is available only to the extent of coverage on any one of
the vehicles with applicable coverage. Coverage on any other vehicles shall not
be added to or stacked upon that coverage. This section shall not apply to re-
duce the coverage available by reason of insurance policies insuring different
named insureds.
55. 374 So. 2d 525, 526 (Fla. 1979).
56. Dewberry v. Auto-Owners Ins. Co., 363 So. 2d 1077, 1079-80 (Fla. 1978).
57. As a general rule, for cases not falling within the purview of the anti-stacking stat-
ute, "multiple coverages are required to be aggregated on uninsured motorist coverages and
medical payments." Travelers Indem. Co. v. Wolfson, 348 So. 2d 661, 662 (Fla. 3d DCA
1977); accord, Tucker v. Government Employees Ins. Co., 228 So. 2d 238, 242 (Fla. 1973).
58. FLA. STAT. § 627.727(3) (1979) provides that for purposes of uninsured motorist cov-
erage, the term "uninsured motor vehicle" includes an insured motor vehicle whose liability
insurer either is insolvent, or "[hias provided limits of bodily injury liability for its insured
which are less than the limits applicable to the injured person provided under uninsured
motorist's coverage applicable to the injured person." This underinsured motorist provision
is applicable only to those policies issued or renewed after October 1, 1973, the effective
date of the statute. See York Ins. Co. v. Becker, 364 So. 2d 858 (Fla. 2d DCA 1978); Coney
v. Reserve Ins. Co., 358 So. 2d 261 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978); Castaneda v. State Farm Mut. Auto.
Ins. Co., 348 So. 2d 1231 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977).
In United States Fire Ins. Co. v. Van Iderstyne, 347 So. 2d 672 (Fla. 4th DCA 1977), an
endorsement extending to an additional vehicle the coverage of a preexisting policy (liability
$50,000/$100,000, UM $10,000/$20,000) was issued to plaintiffs one month after the effective
date of the uninsured motorist statute, FLA. STAT. § 627.727(2) (1979), which required that
UM coverage be not less than bodily injury liability coverage. See note 34 and accompany-
ing text supra. When plaintiffs' minor son was subsequently struck and killed by an insured
tortfeasor, the court held that the endorsement was a severable, separate contract into
19801
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liability insurance lower than the injured party's UM coverage),
the issue of whether coverages may be stacked can be crucial in a
case involving an underinsured tortfeasor. Often the insured's ac-
cess to his UM benefits will turn upon the resolution of this
question.59
There appears to be a general consensus among the District
Courts of Appeal regarding when and to what extent UM coverages
may be stacked. The principle underlying their decisions is appar-
ently to provide the insured, 60 who has paid additional premiums, 1
with the full measure of those coverages applicable to him, rather
than to a particular vehicle.62 Thus, while multiple uninsured mo-
torist68 and medical payments"4 benefits may be stacked, liability"
which the court would write the increased UM coverage mandated by the statute ($50,000/
$100,000). As a result, the tortfeasor with a liability limit of $25,000 was considered an un-
derinsured motorist and plaintiffs had recourse to their UM coverage. Arguably, the court's
rationale permits a harsh result as to the insurer, who was required to provide the increased
UM coverage with no corresponding increase in premium. The Supreme Court of Florida
would later establish in the Dewberry case that individuals are deemed to be on notice of
statutory provisions as of their effective date. See note 56 and accompanying text supra.
59. Only the court may decide the threshold question of applicability of UM coverage;
that determination may not be made through arbitration. See Vigilant Ins. Co. v. Kelps, 372
So. 2d 207 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979).
60. The coverage extends to his family as well. The family relationship, and the in-
sured's presumed intention to provide extra coverage for those close to him, have been cited
in upholding the stacking of parent-owned policies by a child. See Hunt v. State Farm Mut.
Auto. Ins. Co., 349 So. 2d 642 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977). But see McLennan v. State Farm Mut.
Auto Ins. Co., 366 So. 2d 811 (Fla. 4th DCA 1979) (father and son UM stacking disallowed
in December 1976 accident, but the date of issuance or renewal of the policies was not
stated); cf. Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v. Richendollar, 368 So. 2d 603 (Fla. 2d DCA
1979) (because familial relationship did not obtain, employee could not stack employer's
coverage under which he was a beneficiary).
61. As stated by the Supreme Court of Florida in Tucker v. Government Employees
Ins. Co.,
[ain insured under uninsured motorist coverage is entitled by the statute to the
full bodily injury protection that he purchases and for which he pays premiums.
It is useless and meaningless and uneconomic to pay for additional bodily injury
insurance and simultaneously have this coverage cancelled by an insurer's exclu-
sion. The premium rates are standard and uniform on a per car basis. The in-
sured's full protection cannot be whittled away by exclusions or limitations
which presuppose he only intended to cover himself on the presumed basis of
single car auto liability coverage had the uninsured motorist purchased the
same.
288 So. 2d 238, 242 (Fla. 1973).
62. The Tucker court further elaborated: "We must not confuse uninsured motorist
protection as inuring to a particular motor vehicle as in the case of automobile liability
insurance. It is bodily injury insurance which protects against such injury inflicted by the
negligence of any uninsured motorist." Id.; accord, Maine v. Hyde, 350 So. 2d 1161 (Fla. 2d
DCA 1977) (making same comparison in denying stacking of liability coverage).
63. See Aetna Life & Cas. Co. v. Stanger, 367 So. 2d 728 (Fla. 4th DCA 1979). Any UM
recovery will, however, be offset by PIP benefits on the theory that UM coverage is excess
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and PIP66 benefits may not.
It appears to make little difference whether the coverages in-
volved are contained in separate policies67 or are multiple cover-
ages under a single policy." Where an injured individual is the
third-party beneficiary of UM provisions in another's policy, he
may stack that coverage with his own in determining that the
tortfeasor is an underinsured motorist. 9 The rationale 70 permitting
aggregation of coverages, however, does not extend to those situa-
tions in which the claimant attempts to stack the multiple cover-
and therefore should not duplicate coverage. See Fidelity & Cas. Co. v. Moreno, 350 So. 2d
38 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977). But cf. Jones v. Travelers Indem. Co., 357 So. 2d 231 (Fla. 4th DCA
1978) (Danksch, J., dissenting) ("no duplication of funds paid" where claimant's "damages
exceed all available insurance").
64. See Travelers Indem. Co. v. Wolfson, 348 So. 2d 661, 662 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977).
65. See Main v. Hyde, 350 So. 2d 1161 (Fla. 2d DCA 1977); Gibbons v. Shockley, 341
So. 2d 260, 261 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977).
66. See FLA. STAT. § 627.736(4)(e) (1978); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Kilbreath,
362 So. 2d 474 (Fla. 4th DCA 1978); Travelers Indem. Co. v. Wolfson, 348 So. 2d 661 (Fla.
3d DCA 1977); Chappelear v. Allstate Ins. Co., 347 So. 2d 477, 478 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977)
(relying upon exclusion in the policy); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Castaneda, 339 So.
2d 679 (Fla. 3d DCA 1976). But cf. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Kilbreath, 362 So. 2d
474, 475 (Fla. 4th DCA 1978) (Cross, J., concurring specially) ("substantive constitutional
questions are posed by a formulation of law that requires citizens of this state to purchase
multiple policies of personal injury protection (P.I.P.) insurance on which they are then
forbidden to collect").
This latter observation is more compelling under the logic applied by the District Court
of Appeal, Fourth District, in construing the anti-stacking statute, FLA. STAT. § 627.4132
(1979). See note 54 and accompanying text supra. In light of the apparent legislative intent,
the court concluded that in the case of
an injured person to whom several policies are applicable the injured person can
recover on the policy providing the largest coverage. In other words, if the in-
jured person would ordinarily be entitled to coverage under several policies he is
entitled to the benefits of the policy affording the largest amount of insurance
coverage. Construed in that fashion, the section will not apply to reduce the
maximum coverage contained in any one applicable policy.
McLellan v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 366 So. 2d 811, 812 (Fla. 4th DCA 1979).
67. See Arrieta v. Volkswagen Ins. Co., 343 So. 2d 918 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977); State Farm
Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Castaneda, 339 So. 2d 679 (Fla. 3d DCA 1976); State Farm Mut.
Auto. Ins. Co. v. Anderson, 332 So. 2d 623 (Fla. 4th DCA 1976); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins.
Co. v. White, 330 So. 2d 858 (Fla. 2d DCA 1976); Government Employees Ins. Co. v. Farmer,
330 So. 2d 236 (Fla. 1st DCA 1976).
68. See United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Gordon, 359 So. 2d 480 (Fla. 1st DCA
1978); Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. Furman, 341 So. 2d 1056 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977); Government
Employees Ins. Co. v. Dammert, 335 So. 2d 583 (Fla. 3d DCA 1976); Government Employees.
Ins. Co. v. Farmer, 330 So. 2d 236 (Fla. 1st DCA 1976).
69. See Lezcano v. Leatherby Ins. Co., 372 So. 2d 214 (Fla. 4th DCA 1979) (passenger
could stack own and host's UM coverage); United States Fidelity & Guar. Co. v. Curry, 371
So. 2d 677 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979) (lessee's employee could stack own and lessor's UM
coverage).
70. See note 58 and accompanying text supra.
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ages of another'7 or of the tortfeasor and himself.7 2
In Behrmann v. Industrial Fire & Casualty Co.,78 the plaintiff
automobile passenger was injured when her insured host-driver
collided with another vehicle driven by an uninsured motorist. The
plaintiff's own UM coverage was equal to the liability insurance
limits of the insured driver; the court held "for that reason
alone, 74 that the plaintiff was not entitled to collect UM benefits
from her defendant insurer, even though she was also an insured
for the same limits under her host's UM coverage. Plaintiff was not
permitted to stack her insured driver's UM coverage with her own
UM coverage in order to exceed her host's liability coverage and
cross the statutory threshold for underinsured motorist coverage.
In a vigorous dissent 7 5 Judge Schwartz contended that because
there was an additional, uninsured tortfeasor, there was no need to
stack such uninsured motorist coverages. Reasoning that "[i]f both
drivers were insured, the plaintiff would clearly be entitled to re-
cover, in effect, against both of their liability carriers," he con-
cluded that, in accordance with the purpose of UM coverage7 6 the
plaintiff was "entitled to the benefit of both coverages, with her
,own UM properly regarded, not as being 'stacked' upon her
driver's liability policy . . . but as representing the other, unin-
sured, motorist's liability. '77
This logic was apparently approved by the District Court of
Appeal, Third District, in Travelers Insurance Co. v. Wilson.7 s
There, the injured party was involved in an accident with two
tortfeasors-one insured to limits equaling plaintiff's own UM cov-
erage, the other (a phantom vehicle) presumably uninsured. The
Wilson court, while recognizing the general rule that the limits of
the UM policy represented a ceiling on recovery, stated that the
plaintiff's UM coverage would be applicable if his recovery against
the insured tortfeasor fell below that amount.7"
It is unclear from the Behrmann opinion whether the plaintiff
71. See Hartford Accident & Indem. Co. v. Richendollar, 368 So. 2d 603 (Fla. 2d DCA
1979).
72. See Yaden v. Hanover Ins. Co., 375 So. 2d 5 (Fla. 4th DCA 1979); Behrmann v.
Industrial Fire & Cas. Ins. Co., 374 So. 2d 568 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979).
73. 374 So. 2d 568 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979).
74. Id. at 569.
75. Id.
76. That is, "to provide the insured with the same protection accorded if the tortfeasor
were covered by liability insurance." Id.
77. Id. (emphasis in original) (citation omitted).
78. 371 So. 2d 145 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979).
79. Id. at 148.
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sought to recover damages beyond the ceiling set by her own UM
limits. When a plaintiff's injuries in a multiple tortfeasor situation
warrant recovery up to the limits of his UM policy, however, the
Travelers formulation seems to provide a more equitable result, as-
suring compensation in an amount at least equal to the levels of
his own coverage.80
V. CONCURRENT FIRST-PARTY COVERAGE
A. PIP and Medical Payments Benefits
Now we turn to the interrelation between first-party, no-fault
coverages. Personal injury protection (PIP) benefits have been de-
fined as a "creation of the legislature enacted to limit tort suits
where two insured vehicles are involved in an accident in instances
where the one claiming benefits formerly would have sought recov-
ery from the one at fault."81 Because PIP is designed to compen-
sate for out-of-pocket medical expenses and lost earning capacity,8 2
the potential for overlap between PIP benefits and those provided
under worker's compensation and medical payments coverage is
obvious.
The legislature addressed this situation in part by providing
that PIP benefits are primary, "except that benefits under any
worker's compensation law. . . shall be credited against the bene-
fits provided by subsection (1) and shall be due and payable as loss
accrues . ... "88 This latter provision has been ultimately inter-
preted84 to mean that PIP and worker's compensation benefits are
80. See also State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Jenkins, 370 So. 2d 1201 (Fla. 1st DCA
1979); State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Diem, 358 So. 2d 39 (Fla. 3d DCA 1978) ("available
benefits" means that amount actually available to insured from underinsured motorist's lia-
bility carrier).
81. Travelers Indem. Co. v. Wolfson, 348 So. 2d 661, 662 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977). See gen-
erally Henderson, No-Fault Insurance for Automobile Accidents: Status and Effect in the
United States, 56 ORE. L. REv. 287 (1977); Levin & McKenzie, Personal Injury Protection
Coverage, in FLORIDA No-FAULT INSURANCE PRACTIcE 5 (2d ed. 1979).
82. See FLA. STAT. § 627.736(1)(a), (b) (1979).
83. FLA. STAT. § 627.736(4) (1979).
84. See Comeau v. Safeco Ins. Co. of America, 356 So. 2d 790 (Fla. 1978), rev'g 342 So.
2d 1085 (Fla. 1st DCA 1977). The First District had erroneously held that where worker's
compensation and PIP benefits were concurrently received on a pro rata basis, the $5,000
PIP ceiling applied with regard to the aggregate benefits. Construing § 627.736(4), the su-
preme court held:
[Ain insurer is required to supplement workmen's compensation benefits until
the insurer has itself paid the limits of liability under its policy for required
personal injury protection benefits .... This statutory provision is intended to
give a credit, as a loss accrues, for workmen's compensation benefits, thereby
preventing one from recovering for a loss which is not sustained because of
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concurrent, and that the exhaustion of the latter is not a prerequi-
site to receipt of the former. Although there can be no duplication
of recovery, the receipt of worker's compensation benefits does not
reduce the PIP benefits available for additional losses.
8 5
Unfortunately, a similar rationale has not been applied with
regard to medical payments benefits, which by contract are usually
only applicable to defray expenditures arising in the first year after
the accident. In Florida Farm Bureau Casualty Insurance Co. v.
Fichera" and Moylan v. State Farm Mutual Auto Insurance
Co.,87 the insurers, who had sold both PIP and medical payments
coverage in a single policy to their insureds, applied the PIP bene-
fits in the first year to both lost income and medical expenses until
the PIP benefits were exhausted, thereafter refusing to apply the
medical payments coverage to additional medical expenses in-
curred after the one-year limit had passed.8 The District Court of
Appeal, Fourth District, upheld the insurer's refusal to pay in both
cases. But Judge Dauksch's special concurrence" in the Moylan
opinion pointed out that the plaintiff had paid an "additional pre-
mium for this supposed additional benefit" which the insurance
company was not compelled to provide. "In any event," he con-
cluded, "the legislature might look into the matter for the
public."' 0
Although the legislature failed to "look into the matter" in the
two years following the Moylan decision, the Fourth District dis-
covered an alternative means for circumventing that otherwise un-
duly harsh and restrictive result. In Holloway v. State Farm Mu-
tual Auto Insurance Co.,'1 the court determined that the insureds
could maximize their benefits by first exhausting "primary" PIP
coverage with claims for lost wages and later applying the same
workmen's compensation benefits, and is not intended to reduce the limits of
liability under the statutory minimum required for personal injury protection
benefits.
Id. at 794.
85. See id.; Kovarnik v. Royal Globe Ins. Co., 363 So. 2d 166 (Fla. 4th DCA 1978); Fine
v. Travelers Ins. Co., 342 So. 2d 848 (Fla. 3d DCA 1977); Charter Oak Fire Ins. Co. v.
Regalado, 339 So. 2d 277 (Fla. 3d DCA 1976).
86. 366 So. 2d 867 (Fla. 4th DCA 1979).
87. 343 So. 2d 56 (Fla. 4th DCA 1977).
88. In light of the Holloway decision, a suit by the insured against the insurer for bad-
faith failure to act in the best interests of the insured by apportioning benefits might have
been appropriate. See note 91 and accompanying text infra.
89. 343 So. 2d at 57 (Danksch, J., concurring specially).
90. Id.
91. 370 So. 2d 452 (Fla. 4th DCA 1979).
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policy's "excess" medical payments coverage to claims for first-
year medical expenses. In practical effect, this allocation of claims
allows the same equitable result obtained in coordinating PIP and
worker's compensation benefits.
B. Lessors and Lessees
Taking a last look at automobile liability insurance, we focus
on the question of primary and excess coverages as it relates to the
lessor-lessee situation. Section 627.7263(1) of the Florida Statutes
provides that the lessor's "valid and collectible liability insurance
. . . shall be primary unless otherwise stated in bold type. on the
face of the rental or lease agreement. Such insurance shall be pri-
mary for the limits of liability and personal injury protection cov-
erage as required by ss. 324.021(7) and 627.736.1192 This latter stip-
ulation is far from clear. Does it limit the extent to which the
lessor's liability insurance shall be primary, rendering any such
coverage beyond the required minimum "excess" under the stat-
ute? May the lessor's insurer then bring an indemnity action
against the lessee for the amount by which the lessor's liability as
owner (under a common law dangerous instrumentality theory) ex-
ceeds the limited coverage provided in the lease contract?
The Supreme Court of Florida answered this question, as cer-
tified to it by the Fifth Circuit in Insurance Co. of North America
v. Avis Rent-A-Car System, Inc.," in the affirmative. In that case,
a plaintiff injured by the lessee's negligent employee settled with
the insurers of the lessor and lessee for $350,000. The insurers then
litigated their liability inter se under their respective policies (les-
sor: $500,000 limit; lessee: $200,000 limit) and under the automo-
bile lease, by which the lessor had agreed to provide insurance for
the lessee up to a $100,000 limit.
The court restated the rule established in Roth v. Old Repub-
lic Insurance Co.'4 that "insurance provided to the lessee as part
of the rental agreement with the owner places primary financial
responsibility on the owner's carrier and bars indemnification from
the negligent driver to that extent.' 95 But because Roth did not
involve multiple layers of insurance coverage, it was held inappli-
92. FLA. STAT. § 627.7263(1) (1979).
93. 348 So. 2d 1149 (Fla. 1977).
94. 269 So. 2d 3 (Fla. 1972).
95. 348 So. 2d at 1152. See Susco Car Rental Sys. v. Leonard, 112 So. 2d 832 (Fla.
1959). The insurance coverage provided under the rental agreement in Roth was apparently
greater than the amount of the claim against the lessor. 348 So. 2d at 1152 n.7.
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cable to modify the rule of Hertz Corp. v. Ralph M. Parsons Co."
that a lessor could obtain indemnification from a lessee for dam-
ages in excess of the insurance protection afforded the lessee by
the terms of the rental contract. The lessee's insurer in Avis was
thus required to indemnify the lessor's insurer for its payments in
excess of $100,000, up to the $200,000 limit of the lessee's liability
policy.9 7
The Avis court refused to interpret the Financial Responsibil-
ity Law" as requiring coverage under the lease contract to be coex-
tensive with the coverage of the lessor's liability policy:
Neither this statute nor the dangerous instrumentality doctrine
asserts any interest of the state with respect to the allocation of
risk among commercial enterprises to furnish more than mini-
mal statutory coverage to their customers.
We hold that the public policy of the state was satisfied in
this case when the injured's beneficiaries were compensated by
the vehicle's owner for the negligent operation of a rented
vehicle."
Nothing in the statute, however, prevents the lessor from limiting
his primary coverage to the PIP requirement, or from precluding
liability by use of an escape clause in the contract,100 if the stat-
ute's notice requirements101 are met.
The District Court of Appeal, Second District, has recognized
the validity of, and enforced, such an escape clause, thereby plac-
96. 419 F.2d 783 (5th Cir. 1969). In Hertz, the lessor's insurer was indemnified for the
excess of the claim above the lease contract coverage by the insurers of both the lessee and
the lessee's negligent employee.
97. Although the lessor was liable as the owner for the remaining $50,000 above the
primary lease contract coverage plus the lessee's policy limit, the court also held that the
lessor's insurer could seek indemnification in that amount from the negligent employee, the
lessee, or their carriers. 348 So. 2d at 1154.
98. FLA. STAT. § 324.151 (1979).
99. 348 So. 2d at 1154 (footnotes omitted). The lessee's insurer argued that the "stan-
dard rental agreements sold by rental car companies mislead the public and constitute ad-
hesion contracts to be strictly construed against the companies." Id. n.12. See note 45
supra.
100. See American Bankers Ins. Co. v. Leatherby Ins. Co., 350 So. 2d 353 (Fla. 2d DCA
1977) (construing 1976 statute). It is also arguable, however, that under the statute the les-
sor's liability should be primary in any event, up to the limits of PIP coverage.
101. FLA. STAT. § 627.7263(2) provides:
Each rental or lease agreement between the lessee and the lessor shall con-
tain a provision on the face of the agreement, stated in bold type, informing the
lessee of the provisions of subsection (1) and shall provide a space for the
lessee's insurance company's name if the lessor's insurance is not to be primary.
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ing primary liability responsibility on the lessee.' The District
Court of Appeal, Third District, in contrast, has held that such
escape clauses are invalid and unenforceable as against public pol-
icy.103 In so holding, however, that court has enforced the primary
responsibility of the lessor only up to the statutory minimum cov-
erage. Although such decisions reflect the desirable principle of
freedom of contract between lessors and lessees with regard to
risk-shifting, the notice provisions of the statute should be strictly
enforced to avoid abuse in this adhesion contract situation.'"
VI. CONCLUSION
It is clear, in reviewing recent decisions regarding Florida's
auto compensation law, that the important role of insurance in au-
tomobile reparations is one whose parameters are only slowly and
painstakingly being realized. With regard to the necessary goals of
any auto reparations system, we would agree with Professor Con-
ard's formulation:
The most important service that economic treatment can
perform is to assure the accessibility of medical treatment.
Wounds should be healed, bones set, prostheses supplied,
psychic readjustment achieved, and occupational retraining pro-
vided when needed.
These things should be done, it seems to me, for every vic-
tim, regardless of whether or not the victim was himself careless,
whether or not the guilty driver can be found, and whether or
not he can pay or has purchased adequate insurance. Medical
services should be supplied for humanitarian reasons-because
the modern conscience demands that no one unnecessarily be
left physically impaired. They should also be supplied for eco-
nomic reasons-because everyone loses when a member of soci-
ety ceases to contribute to the national product and becomes
instead a burden on the shoulders of others.108
It is true that Florida's no-fault scheme has advanced beyond its
embryonic stages, but it is not yet adequate to recompense the
horrendous losses, both personal and societal, which occur in the
102. See American Bankers Ins. Co. v. Leatherby Ins. Co., 350 So. 2d 353 (Fla. 2d DCA
1977) (quoting Avis).
103. See Lehman-Eastern Auto Rentals v. Brooks, 370 So. 2d 14 (Fla. 3d DCA 1979);
Executive Rent-A-Car, Inc. v. Uditsky, 297 So. 2d 340 (Fla. 3d DCA 1974), cert. denied, 310
So. 2d 742 (Fla. 1975).
104. See note 45 supra.
105. See Conard, The Economic Treatment of Automobile Injuries, 63 MICH. L. REv..
279, 294-95 (1964).
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case of automobile accident catastrophes. Statutory changes such
as the recent raising of PIP benefit levels do reflect an awareness
on the part of the legislature that "the law, like the technology of
transportation"10 6 must keep abreast of changing times. The mea-
sures thus far taken, however, although steps in the right direction,
must be further developed before they can begin to accomplish the
many goals of auto reparations reform.
106. See Morriss & Paul, The Financial Impact of Automobile Accidents, 110 U. PA. L.
REy. 913, 932 (1962).
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